The Use of Force in the International System and its Contemporary Examples

Elia O’Hara 

PSC 201: Intro to International Relations

Professor Courtney

October 20, 2022 

The application of force in the international system today tends not to follow the strict definitions well laid out and rationalized by International Relations scholars. Instead, they seem to align with their underlying principles with a significant amount of blending and overlap due to what I feel is an incredibly connected and complex system of state interactions. Identifying the traditionally recognized uses of force, known as defense, deterrence, compellence, and swaggering, accentuates the varying degrees of application in contemporary examples; allowing a more compressive view of how these well-written and articulate definitions of force become messy and convoluted when applied to real-world situations. For instance, looking at the extent of compellence and coercive force within the Russian and Ukraine war and North Korea’s swaggering tactics can accentuate the spectrum of how force is utilized in real-world scenarios. 

Before examining the uses of force in our international system today, acknowledging the established definitions and functions of force from prominent International Relations scholars, such as Robert Art and Thomas Schelling, aids in our later discussion of how they take shape today. From our textbook, International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, the article titled “The Four Functions of Force” by Art recognizes defensive, deterrent, compellent, and swaggering as the readily understandable categories states and actors employ.   

The defensive use of force in its basic form is “the deployment of military power…to ward off an attack and to minimize damage to oneself if attacked”(Art and Jervis 2017) with additional employment of preventative and or preemptive strikes. The second function is the deterrent use of force which provides a threat of retaliation, meaning using military powers “to prevent an adversary from doing something that one does not want him to do and that he might otherwise be tempted to do by threatening him with unacceptable punishments if he does”(Art and Jervis 2017). Compellent usage of force, as defined by IR scholar Thomas Schelling “involves initiating an action…that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds”(Art and Jervis 2017), meaning that the success of a compellent is measured by how quickly and closely the target satisfies their adversaries wishes. Art recognizes the last function of force, and most accessible to achieve, as swaggering, which is more of an egotistical display of scenarios such as “military might…national demonstrations and buying or building the era’s most prestigious weapons” (Art and Jervis 2017). While Art sees swaggering as “ill-defined” or lacking a specific intended target, the example found in today’s international system raises the question against those assumptions. 

The extent to which force in our international system today either aligns with or takes a different approach than those expressed in conventionally accepted definitions can lead to examples such as the Russian and Ukraine war that has had ongoing entanglements since 2014. Looking at the connections or alignment with the four functions of force summarized above, the compellent use of force seems to align fundamentally with Putin’s endeavors. There is a physical aspect in which Putin is forcing a change in behavior. Specifically, Putin has advanced this notion that, historically, Ukraine is part of Russia and should return as such. This showcases how his deployment of military power aims to compel his adversaries to recognize this rhetoric and modify their actions in allowing him to control Ukraine. 

However, the interconnectedness of this war brings a variation of the traditional and textbook example of compellent force. Part of this war overlaps with tensions between Russia and the West, especially the United States, as Putin sees the potential threat of Ukraine becoming influenced by westernization and, therefore, not as easily manipulated by his political ideologies. An interesting point made from Dr. Daniel Goure of the Lexington Institution illustrated how this war has taken a mixture of the functions of force by stating, “For the Kremlin, deterrence is a form of operant conditioning; it is in effect when the US and its allies condition their actions with an eye towards avoiding confrontation with Russia. Compellence is the active form of the same principle. It is a matter of actively challenging Western actions in order to force a stand down. Instead of the term compellence, a better word to describe the Russian approach is coercion…”(Goure 2019). 

This assertion highlights the importance of understanding the multifaceted nature of specific state interactions that may pose varying degrees of the four functions of force we have analyzed. For instance, I also see a divergence between strict compellence into a fusion of coercion and destructive forces. The purely militaristic forces trying to eliminate Ukraine’s military assets are present, but eliminating those same assets can additionally take a form of coercion that forecasts what is to come if the behaviors of Ukraine and western involvement do not alter. 

Taking the subject of swaggering and to what extent I see it aligning with contemporary global scenarios, I found that North Korea could adhere to and deviate from the applications of force in the world today, especially when pursuing the debate of pure swaggering versus that of peaceful compellence. Again, swaggering from a standard definition could explain the connection to our textbook and other IR scholars’ views of a state attempting to feel respected and influential. Nevertheless, in the case of North Korea, the idea that the actions they take have no specific aim raises some doubt. Their “swaggering” tactics, such as extravagant displays of nationalism and military might, are unquestionably aimed at global world powers such as the U.S and, therefore, our allies to make a point that goes beyond just ego. 

I also found the question of whether North Korea’s global display of immense military strength aligns with the theory of peaceful compellence notable in this discussion. Our textbook defines this notion of a peaceful compellent as “a state can take actions against another that do not cause physical harm but that require the latter to pay some type of significant price until it changes its behavior”(Art and Jervis 2017). Part of the reasoning behind this connection to North Korea is that in the conventional meaning of swaggering, one could surmise that there is no target intended from the display of excessive national pride or prestige. Quickly examining the history of North Korea and the United States, it would be logical to assume that their swaggering tactics hold a deeper meaning. Specifically, understanding the effects of the Korean War and, subsequently, our involvement in South Korea followed by violations of UN Security Council measures where“… North Korea continues overt nuclear enrichment and long-range missile development efforts”(CPA 2022). One could hold those swaggering tactics as actually an example or a potential threat of what the U.S could encounter if we decided to alter our actions in a way that North Korea found unsatisfactory. 

Through examining pertinent real-world examples such as the Russian-Ukraine war and North Korea’s militaristic endeavors, the degree to which their employments of force align with the definitions we have looked at in class is worth pursuing. Taking the accepted delineations of force and finding the layers of meaning underneath certain states’ actions points to a realization that the highly complicated nature of the international system extends to the application of force. 

Works Cited

Art, Robert J, and Robert Jervis. 2017. International Politics : Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. 13th ed. Boston: Pearson.

Goure, Daniel. 2019. “HOW DOES RUSSIA PERCEIVE DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, ESCALATION MANAGEMENT, and the CONTINUUM of CONFLICT?” Russian Strategic Intentions a Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) White Paper. 2019. https://www.bruce-douglass.com/_files/ugd/21dc4f_6db1bf428a0d423b96226c3e6ec4a055.pdf#page=48.

The Center for Preventative Action (CPA). 2022. “North Korea Crisis.” Global Conflict Tracker. May 4, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/north-korea-crisis.